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International Regulation of Foreign
Direct Investment
Wesley Scholz*
Introduction
This Article reproduces a presentation made at the Cornell Law School
Symposium on March 6, 1998. It discusses the significance of the Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Specifically, the Article explains (1)
the importance of the MAI to the United States, (2) why the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is hosting the MAI
negotiations, and (3) the key issues under discussion among MAI negotia-
tors. The Article intends to place, the MAI negotiations in a broader
context.1
I. Why is the MAI Important?
Foreign investment makes a crucial and growing contribution to the pros-
perity of the United States. In 1996, the flow of foreign direct investment
into the United States reached $78.8 billion while outflows reached $85.6
billion - larger than any other country.2
In a global economy, U.S. firms need a worldwide presence to suc-
ceed. For example, service industries, which accounted for $277.1 billion
in exports in 1997,3 require a physical presence in foreign markets to com-
pete effectively. Approximately twenty-six percent of U.S. exports are
channeled through foreign-based affiliates of U.S. companies. 4
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1. Consistent with this objective, this Article provides a broad overview of issues
addressed in the MAI negotiations. The author's views on the MAI negotiations and its
participants derive from his own participation in the negotiations and do not purport to
represent the current position of the parties themselves.
2. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALysis, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BusiNEss 114-15, 144-45 (Sept. 1997); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEv., WORLD
INvEsTMENT REPORT, 1997, at 303, 308, U.N. Doc. TD/JUNCTAD/ITE/IIT/5, U.N. Sales
No. 97.II.D.10 (1997).
3. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYsis, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BusiNEss 40, 67 (Aug. 1998).
4. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALysis, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BusiNEss 50, table 4 (Oct. 1997) (1995 figure).
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Foreign investment within the United States stimulates the American
economy. Foreign owned companies not only employ five million Ameri-
can citizens,5 but they also contribute new technologies to the U.S. econ-
omy. In addition, foreign firms generally pay higher wages than
comparable U.S. companies and demonstrate greater labor productivity.
Recently, developing countries have become more receptive to foreign
investment as they recognize its benefits to economic development. Private
foreign investment flows now substantially outpace foreign assistance
funds. The global explosion of bilateral investment treaties since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, from 435 in 1990, to 1247 by the end of 1996, demon-
strates developing countries' interest in foreign investment. 6 In addition,
investment discussions in the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) look to the MAI as a model for multilateral rules. Simi-
laraly, several of the transition and advanced developing economies have
expressed interest in acceding to the MAI, including the five observers
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, and Slovakia) and the Baltics.
II. The Importance of the MAI to the United States
The United States needs to enhance its global competitiveness by ensuring
the fair treatment of its investors abroad. Furthermore, the United States
must continue to maintain an open environment for foreign investment
within its own borders. The primary U.S. objectives are (1) to ensure that
the MAI fosters global efforts to protect the environment, (2) to respect
internationally recognized core labor standards, and (3) to achieve sustain-
able development.
The principle of non-discrimination underlies the MAI. This is appar-
ent from the basic architecture of the MAI, which follows the familiar lines
of the forty-two bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that the United States
negotiated during the last two decades, as well as the investment chapter of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The United States
seeks to improve this framework wherever possible. The MAI's primary
features will include:
- non-discrimination policies regarding U.S. investment abroad and the
application of these principles to U.S. investors seeking to establish a
presence in a foreign market;
- freedom to conduct investment-related transfers, including transfers of
profits, capital, royalties, and fees, whether into or out of the country
where the investment takes place;
- international legal standards for expropriation and compensation con-
sistent with U.S. legal principles and practice;
5. See BUREAU OF EcON. ANALYsis, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS 39 (June 1998).
6. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT Dispums, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 1959-1996, at 1-96 (1997).
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- disciplines on performance requirements including trade and foreign
exchange balancing requirements that create trade and investment dis-
tortions; and
- compulsory international dispute settlement procedures, including
international arbitration for disputes between nations and individual
investors when the investors can establish that a violation of the agree-
ment caused them to suffer a specific harm.
Ill. Why OECD is Hosting the MAI Negotiations
Twenty-nine advanced countries in Europe, Asia, and North America com-
prise the OECD. These countries include the largest sources of, and the
largest destinations for, foreign investment. The OECD has a long track
record of dealing with investment issues, as well as social and environmen-
tal problems. The members of the OECD generally possess high labor
standards and good records on environmental protection. These factors
result in a commonality of values not reflected in wider fora, such as the
WTO. These common principles afford the United States an opportunity
to secure an investment agreement that meets both its investment and
social policy objectives.
The OECD countries must participate to establish successful multilat-
eral rules. Other countries will likely view the MAI as an opportunity to
demonstrate their readiness to meet high standards and to position them-
selves to attract capital in a manner that is sensitive to labor and environ-
mental interests. Many developing economies follow the negotiations.
Some have indicated a strong interest in becoming charter members.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithua-
nia are all observers to the MAI negotiations.
IV. What Are the Key Issues Under Discussion?
A. Carve-Outs and Exceptions
The United States insists that the MAI will result in a satisfactory balance
of commitments and meaningful improvements in U.S. firms' access to for-
eign markets. Presently, the United States remains unsatisfied with the
commitments on the table. Some of the U.S. partners seek ambiguous and
sweeping carve-outs, including a proposal by the EU for a carve-out for
"Regional Economic Integration Organizations" and proposals by several
countries for a general "cultural industries" carve-out. The United States
also objects to country specific-exceptions requested by many of its negoti-
ating partners.
In addition, the U.S. delegation argues that the provisions of the MAI
cannot interfere with the normal, non-discriminatory regulatory activities
in areas such as health, safety and the environment. In particular, the
United States desires to ensure that the expropriation article of the MAI
contains no clause authorizing "inappropriate" challenges to sovereign reg-
ulatory decisions. Other countries, initially skeptical of U.S. concerns,
have become more receptive and support this objective.
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Furthermore, the United States is determined to protect existing meas-
ures where, for policy reasons, it wishes to reserve the right to deviate from
MAI commitments. For example, the United States has strongly supported
a general exception for measures deemed necessary to protect vital
national security interests. Specifically, the United States tabled excep-
tions to specific obligations for all existing non-conforming measures at
the state and local level. In addition, the United States proposed other
exceptions consistent with NAFTA and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
The United States preserved its freedom to maneuver in areas such as pro-
grams to support minorities. Moreover, the United States also proposed an
exception for subsidies and government procurement programs that would
protect future and existing programs that discriminate against foreign
investors.
B. Dispute Settlement
Similar to BITs involving the United States and the investment chapter of
NAFTA, the MAI will include provisions for state-to-state and investor-to-
state dispute settlement. Dispute settlement provisions provide an impor-
tant tool of last resort for U.S. businesses, especially in countries with lack-
luster legal protections and court systems.
The United States possesses strong constitutional protections and an
effective court system that provides important protections for foreign inves-
tors. The predictability and reliability of the U.S. legal system is a strong
incentive for investors to rely on the protections U.S. law affords, rather
than international arbitration. Indeed, no investment dispute arbitrations
occurred within any jurisdiction of the United States, either under U.S.
BITs or the investment chapter of NAFTA.
C. Environmental Protection and Labor Standards
A well-designed MAI possesses the potential to advance U.S. aims regarding
environmental protection and internationally recognized core labor stan-
dards. The OECD Secretariat assembled considerable evidence suggesting
that foreign investment favorably affects environmental protections and
labor standards abroad. Many U.S. companies "export" their high stan-
dards when they operate abroad. In fact, OECD nations have developed
one of the few multilateral codes for business, which include both labor
and environmental provisions. The MAI will use these Guidelines for Mul-
tinational Enterprise.
The United States proposed a series of measures to strengthen MAI
environmental provisions. Patterned on NAFTA,7 these proposals include
provisions on health, safety, and the environment. For example, these
measures include the right of each party to establish its own levels of
domestic environmental protection and encourage environmental impact
assessments for proposed investments inv olving a governmental action.
7. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., art.
1114, 32 I.L.M. 605, 642 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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These provisions affirm the legitimacy of such regulations, provided that
they are consistent with the agreement.
The United States also focused on provisions that affect U.S. workers.
In addition to the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, the
United States seeks support for internationally-recognized core labor
standards.
Agreement exists that the parties should not engage in a "race to the
bottom" by lowering their health, safety, and environmental standards, nor
should they retreat from supporting internationally recognized core labor
standards in order to attract investment. OECD countries, however,
broadly share U.S. values in these areas; the OECD maintains a long tradi-
tion of dealing with environmental and labor concerns.
In order to ensure that non-OECD countries meet basic environmental
and labor standards, the United States has suggested the possibility of
"readiness criteria" to measure the ability of potential new members to
meet basic commitments. 8 On the margins of the MAI negotiations, the
United States is cooperating with the Europeans on disciplines that deter
investment in property expropriated inconsistent with the requirements of
international law.9 Additionally, the United States seeks agreement on a
general set of global disciplines that also would apply to expropriated
American property in Cuba.
D. Right to Regulation
The United States also proposed language to preserve America's general
right to regulate. One such example is a proposal that clarifies why
nations must evaluate questions of national and most-favored-nation treat-
ment by comparing investors or investments that are "in like circum-
stances." 10  The United States proposed additional language on
transparency to provide for the verification of information in order to
ensure compliance with a party's laws and regulations.
8. See Understanding between the United States and the European Union (Apr. 14,
1997) (document on file with author) (addressing issues under the Libertad Act and the
Iran and Libya Sanction Act (ILSA)).
9. Id. The discussion flows out of the April 11, 1997 understanding concluded by
Ambassador Eizenstat and EU Commission Sir Leon Brittan.
10. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), PACKAGE
OF ADDITIONAL U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSALS TO THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (Jan. 1998) (doc-
ument on file with author). The proposal language reads as follows:
"In like circumstances" ensures that comparisons are made between investors
and investment on the basis of characteristics that are relevant for the purposes
of the comparison. The objective is to permit the consideration of all relevant
circumstances, including those relating to a foreign investor and its investment,
in deciding to which domestic or third country investors and investments they
should appropriately be compared, while excluding from consideration those
characteristics that are not germane to such a comparison.
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V. When Are the Negotiations Likely to Conclude?
Accuracy must trump alacrity in the MAI negotiations. At a recent meeting
of the parties, Ambassadors Eizenstat and Lang made clear the U.S. view
that it will not conclude any agreement, let alone the high quality agree-
ment it seeks, in time for the OECD Ministerial in April." Reaching a high
quality agreement will require hard work in narrowing proposed carve-
outs, careful attention to regulatory issues, and real dialogue with inter-
ested constituencies. Success is not assured. The benefits of success, how-
ever, leave little doubt that the United States should embrace the challenge.
11. See Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State, and Jeffrey Lang, Deputy U.S.
Trade Representative, Statement on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Feb. 17,
1998) (document on file with author).
